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Abstract
We propose a multisector endogenous growth model incorporating social capital.
Social capital only serves as input in the production of human capital and it involves
a cost in terms of the final good. We show that in contrast to existing alternative
specifications, this setting assures that social capital enhances productivity gains by
playing the role of a timing belt driving the transmission and propagation of all
productivity shocks throughout society whatever the sectoral origin of the shocks.
Further econometric work is conducted in order to estimate the contribution of social
capital to human capital formation. We find that depending on the measure of social
capital considered, the elasticity of human capital to social capital varies from 6% to
10%. Finally we investigate the short-term dynamics and imbalance effects properties
of the models depending on the value of this elasticity (taking the Lucas-Uzawa model
as a limit case). In particular, it’s shown that when the substitutability of social cap-
ital to human capital increases, the economy is better equipped to surmount initial
imbalances as individuals may allocate more working time in the final goods sector
without impeding economic growth.
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1 Introduction
The concept of social capital has recently received rising acceptance in economics research.
It has been pointed as a potential source of economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Se-
queira and Ferreira-Lopes, 2008). While some researchers still express some reluctance to
consider it as a “capital”,1 an increasing number of economists now admit that social capital
shares at least some similarities with physical and human capital namely its intertemporal
dimension and its ability to generate a stream of future benefits (Chou, 2006). Like other
sociological concepts, social capital encompasses several different meanings. According to
Knack and Keefer (1997), trust, cooperative norms, and associations within groups repre-
sent the essence of the definition of that concept. Others characterize it in terms of cultural
values such as compassion, altruism and tolerance, while others emphasize institutions and
the quality and quantity of “associational” life. Some researchers find it practical to sepa-
rate the sources of social capital (primarily, social networks) from their consequences (which
can be positive or negative, depending on the circumstances), such as trust, tolerance and
cooperation (Chou, 2006).
Several empirical papers have tried to assess the impact of different dimensions of social
capital on economic growth. Indicators of social capital has been shown to affect local
financial development as well as general economic growth in Italy (Helliwell and Putnam,
1995). Knack and Keefer (1997) establish a causal relationship between trust and growth.
Controlling for initial income per head, a human capital variable, and the relative price
of investment goods, they find that a level of trust that is 10 percentage points higher
implies an annual growth rate higher by 0.8 percentage points. However, they do not find
a very robust association (Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes, 2006). Temple and Johnson (1998)
use an index composed by several measures of social capital. They found those measures
useful for predicting economic growth. Several other empirical studies estimate a robust
relationship between social capital and growth but with a wide interval of point estimates
(e.g. Beugelsdijk et al., 2004; Whiteley, 2000; Rupasinga, 2000). Figure 1 depicts the
relationship between economic growth and various dimensions of social capital. It indicates
that the economic growth rate rises with the different social capital measures.
By which channel social capital affects economic growth? According to Knack and
Keefer (1997), social capital impacts economic performance by improving cooperation and
confidence between economic agents. Economic activities that require some agents to rely
1For instance, Solow (1995) suggests that social capital may hardly be considered as capital since the
measurement of its stock “seems very far away”.
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on the future actions of others are realized at lower cost in higher trust environments (Knack
and Keefer, 1997). Individuals in high trust societies are also likely to divert fewer resources
to protecting themselves — through tax payments, bribes, or private security services and
equipment — from unlawful (criminal) violations of their property rights. Trust may also
favor innovation. When entrepreneurs devote more time to monitoring possible malfeasance
by partners, employees, and suppliers, they have less time to devote to innovation in new
products or processes (Knack and Keefer, 1997).
Nevertheless, in this contribution we choose to focus on another channel through which
social capital impacts economic growth: the influence of social capital in human capital
accumulation. To do, so we assume that human and social capital are both necessary
inputs for human capital accumulation and that social capital does not play any role in
the production of goods and services. The literature on social capital has acknowledged
the fact that trusting societies, in addition to have stronger incentives to innovate and
to accumulate physical capital, are also likely to have higher returns to accumulation of
human capital. Where trust improves access to credit for the poor, enrollment in secondary
education — which, unlike primary education, has a high cost in forgone income — may
be higher (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1997). The issue of the interaction
between human and social capital and their joint effects on economic growth, though less
developed by the literature, is very important (Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes, 2008). Glaeser
et al. (2002) found a strong empirical relationship between human capital and membership
of a given social organization (the proxy used to measure social capital).
The impact of civil society, and social networks on the education and raising of children
has long been recognized (Chou, 2006). This has been well encapsulated in the old African
proverb, “It takes a village to raise a child”. Coleman (1994) argues that “social capital is
the set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community social organization.
Those resources are useful for the cognitive or social development of a child or young
person”. Teachman et al. (1997) pointed out that social capital is important in the creation
of human capital. These last authors found that a wide range of social capital indicators
determine school continuation (Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes, 2008). Becker (1993), the great
pioneer in the study of the economics of human capital, also recognized the importance of
family relations on human capital accumulation. He acknowledges that “no discussion of
human capital can omit the influence of families on the knowledge, skills, values, and habits
of children”.
Empirical evidence backs the alleged interaction between human and social capital. Us-
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ing the number of siblings as a proxy for social capital,2 Coleman (1988) provides empirical
evidence that the presence of social capital within the family is important in determining
whether a child drops out of school. Coleman also uncovers that social capital outside the
family has a significant impact on the dropping out decision. Students who have changed
schools because their parents moved are more likely to drop out than others. For families
that often changed locations, the social relations that constitute social capital are broken
at each move. Furthermore, he finds that dropout rates are lower in religiously based pri-
vate schools than in public or secular private schools. He also discovered that whether
parents devote time to religious activities affects human capital accumulation in their off-
spring. Grootaert and Van-Bastelaer (2002) provide evidence that community participation
in parent teacher associations in Burkina Faso is associated with substantially higher rates
of school attendance. Other relevant empirical findings are provided by Costa and Kahn
(2001), where the rise in women’s labor force participation rates explains the observed de-
cline in social capital produced within the home, and by Glaeser et al. (2000), who find
that people who invest in human capital also invest in social capital.
From all this empirical literature, we may conclude that there are complementarities
between social and human capital in human capital accumulation and a positive correla-
tion between both possibly caused by double-sided causality (Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes,
2008).
Relation to literature
To date, only few papers have jointly considered social and human capital in models of
economic growth. This has been done in Bisin and Guaitoli (2006) in an OLG framework.
They are concerned with the different roles human and social capital have in rural and
urban societies. Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes (2008) consider a three sector endogenous
growth model where human capital and social capital are complementary in the production
of the final good and substitutes in the production of each other. They assume that there is
an opportunity cost of accumulating social capital in terms of human capital and foregone
earnings.
In his formal three sector model of bonding social capital, Chou (2006) departs from
Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes (2008) in two respects: firstly, he assumes that social capital
has no direct effect on final goods production but impacts it only indirectly through human
capital accumulation. Secondly, he considers that human and social capital are comple-
mentary in the production of each other. We will follow Chou (2006) in two respects.
2The number of siblings measures the dilution of adult attention to a child.
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Firstly, as we believe that social capital matters essentially in the education sector, we
assume that social capital has no direct effect on final goods production. Secondly, as we
aim to remain consistent with the aforementioned evidence that human and social capital
are complementary in human capital accumulation, we depart from Sequeira and Ferreira-
Lopes (2008) assumption that human and social capital are substitutes in human capital
accumulation. However, conversely to Chou (2006) and Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes (2008)
we do not consider that accumulation of social capital requires a specific technology. We
rather assume that the output of the final goods sector can be used on a one-for-one basis
for consumption, investment in physical capital and investment in social capital. Such an
assumption implies that accumulating social capital implies an opportunity cost only in
terms of consumption and physical capital accumulation. By doing so, we aim to capture
two main features of social capital.
1. Essentially, our multisectoral modelling attempts at reflecting the main property of
social capital as advocated by its early proponents: “...that social networks have
value. Just as a screwdriver (physical capital) or a university education (human cap-
ital) can increase productivity (both individual and collective), so do social contacts
affect the productivity of individuals and groups...” (Putnam, 2000). That is social
capital enhances productivity gains by playing the role of a timing belt driving the
transmission and propagation of productivity improvements throughout society. By
modelling investment in social capital in terms of the final good, and not in terms
of specific human capital, we can obtain the latter outcomes. In particular, we will
show that any productivity shock in any sector, including the final good sector, will
affect all the sectors and the long-run growth rate of the economy, in contrast to the
benchmark Lucas-Uzawa model where only productivity shocks in the education sec-
tor matter for long-term growth. If social investment were integrally built with human
capital as in Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes (2008), we would obtain exactly the same
shock propagation mechanism as in the Lucas-Uzawa model. This is demonstrated
explicitly in our Appendix E.
2. An immediate implication of our modelling of social capital is that it should be larger
in richer countries. Though such an implication could be discussed on many grounds,
specially given the variety of ways to measure social capital, we believe that it does
not go at odds with cross-country evidence as reflected in Figure 1: using 2 different
measures of social capital (norms of civic behavior and trust indicators) in 1995 and
2000, we show that social capital measures grow in average with real GDP per capita.
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Main findings
In addition to the contributions to modelling social capital in multisectoral growth
setting as explained above, several findings can be put forward.
1. First of all, we theoretically show that the impact of social capital on long-term growth
(in the range of admissible parameterizations) as measured by the elasticity of human
capital with respect to social capital in the education sector is ambiguous. One effect
is obvious: since social capital (increased through final good expenditures) adds to
human capital as a growth engine, long-term growth should be increased thanks to
this additional channel. Furthermore, one would conclude that according to the latter
reasoning, the more important is social capital in the education sector, the larger the
long-term growth attainable. However, this property is not true for all values of the
elasticity of human capital to social capital: in particular when this elasticity is close
to zero (or equivalently, if we are close enough to the benchmark Lucas-Uzawa model),
the long-term growth rate first decreases. It only raises when this elasticity becomes
large enough. Therefore, there is another mechanism counter-balancing the one just
mentioned, the interaction of both being responsible of that non-monotonic pattern.
This opposite mechanism may be explained as follows: as the elasticity rises, the
education sector relies less on human capital and more on social capital, which leads
to having a smaller share of human capital in the education sector (and more in the
final good sector), ultimately pushing long-term growth down.
2. Because the previous finding points at the necessity to estimate the elasticity of human
capital with respect to social capital in the education sector, we do undertake this
challenge. Given data limitation concerning social capital, we could only run simple
econometric regressions using the World Values Survey for social capital measures
and GDP per capita growth (PPP-adjusted) within the period 1980-2000. Our main
finding in this respect is that the elasticity of human capital to social capital varies
from 6% to 10% depending on the measure of social capital selected.
3. Last but not least, we provide with a complete study of the dynamic implications
of social capital. To this end, we carefully calibrate the model and simulate the
resulting dynamic systems. Two sets of exercises are considered: technological shocks
and imbalance effects analysis (that is dynamics induced when initial conditions are
not equal to the corresponding long-term values). For the exercises to be insightful,
we consider three different structures depending on the value of elasticity of human
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capital with respect to social capital: the limit Lucas-Uzawa case (without social
capital), the “realistic” parameterization using the result of the priori econometric
step, and a last fictive case where social capital is as important as human capital in
the education sector. It’s shown that this elasticity parameter plays a crucial role in
the short-term dynamics and imbalance effects generated by the model. In particular,
it’s shown that when the substitutability of social capital to human capital increases,
the economy is better equipped to surmount initial imbalances as individuals may
allocate more working time in the final goods sector without impeding economic
growth.
4. In the case of a “realistic calibration”, the weight of social capital in human capital
accumulation is low. Then, the only way to foster economic growth is through in-
creases of the human to social capital ratio. Such a parameter region is consistent
with a finding of Putnam (2000) according to which social capital has been declining
in the US, whereas the economy has been growing. This trend is in contrast to what
happened in the first half of the century (Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes, 2008).
The paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the model. The third
section presents some numerical simulations. Then, section 4 provides some concluding
remarks.
2 The model
We present here our endogenous growth model with many identical infinitely lived agents
and two sectors. The final goods sector production technology relies on a Cobb-Douglas
production function using two types of input: physical and human capital. The second
sector is devoted to human capital accumulation thanks to a Cobb-Douglas human capital
technology, using human and social capital as outputs. The output of the final goods
sector can be used either for consumption, investment in physical capital or for investment
in social capital. Therefore, in our model each agent faces a trade-off between devoting
human capital to final goods production and to human capital accumulation, and between
allocating final goods production to either consumption, investments in physical and social
capital.
Our formal model implies the following assumptions: (1) the building or accumulation
of social capital requires resources to be diverted from final goods production; (2) social
capital decays over time without new “investment” in social capital; (3) social capital
7
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Figure 1: Relationship between social capital and economic development
has a positive impact of human capital accumulation but no direct effect on final goods
production; (4) human capital has positive intertemporal spillovers in its accumulation; and
(5) human capital is an important input in final goods production.
2.1 Production of final goods and capital accumulation
2.1.1 First sector: final goods production, physical and social capital accumu-
lation
The final good sector produces a homogeneous good that is used either to consume or to
invest in either physical or social capital. The investment in social capital may increase
social interaction. It is detrimental to the physical capital accumulation since it reduces the
amount of resources devoted to the physical capital investment. Therefore, it is potentially
harmful to the growth of final good production. Moreover, it implies an opportunity cost
in terms of foregone consumption. However, as shown in the next subsection, those adverse
effects may be compensated by its positive impact on human capital growth. Individuals
allocate a fraction u(t) of their time to the production of final goods. Under the Cobb-
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Douglas technology, the production function takes the following form:
Y (t) = A (K (t))α (u (t)H (t))1−α = C (t) + IK (t) + IS (t) (1)
The remaining fraction of time is allocated to human capital accumulation. Equation (1)
shows that production of the final goods enable current consumption, and investment in
either physical and social capital. Physical and social capital laws of accumulation are
respectively:
K (t+ 1) = IK (t)− δK (t) = Y (t)− C (t)− IS (t) + (1− δ)K (t) (2)
S (t+ 1) = IS (t) + (1− δ)S (t) (3)
We consider that all forms of capital depreciate at the same rate δ.
2.1.2 Second sector: human capital accumulation
Individuals allocate the complementary fraction of their time, i.e. 1−u (t), to the accumu-
lation of human capital
H (t+ 1) = B ((1− u (t))H (t))β (S (t))1−β + (1− δ)H (t) (4)
The law of motion depicted in (4) is consistent with the assumption that final goods
sector is more intensive in physical capital while the education sector is more intensive in
human and social capital. Social and human capital are to a certain extent complementary
in the educational sector production function. This captures the aforementioned observation
that social capital is important in the creation of human capital and that both interact in
human capital accumulation. Further, one may ensure the usual requirement that the final
good sector is less intensive in human capital than the education sector (putting social
capital aside). This requires the restriction:
1− α < β,
to hold. We shall have it in mind throughout this paper but we also consider theoretically
possible situations where the education sector output relies more on social capital than on
“pure” human capital. This possibility is certainly consistent with a much less academic
view of human capital. In this case, the elasticity parameter β might be below 1− α.
Eventually, this model exhibits an asymmetry that is quite standard in two sectors en-
dogenous growth model (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1992): we have on one hand physical
and social capital whose accumulations are perfect substitute for consumption, and human
capital on the other hand whose accumulation proceeds from a different technology.
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2.2 Firms
The final good sector produces a composite good that is used either to consume or to
invest in physical capital or in social capital. Following the classical Ramsey, Cass and
Koopmans model (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995), we make the standard assumption that
firms produce final goods, pay wages for human capital input and make rental payments
for physical capital input. Given the Cobb–Douglas production function already described
in (1), the discounted profits are given by:
Π (t) =
∞∑
t=0
[Y (t)− r (t)K (t)− wY (t) (u (t)H (t))]R (t) (5)
where R (0) = 1 and R (t) =
t∏
τ=0
(
1
1 + r (τ)
)
is the discount factor at time t.
The representative firm chooses physical capital and human capital in order to maximize
its discounted profits taking prices as given and subject to its technological constraint:
max
{K(t)∞t=0,(u(t)H(t))
∞
t=0}
Π(t) (6)
Because the firm rents capital and labor services and do not face any adjustment costs,
there are no intertemporal elements in the firm’s optimization problem. This implies that
the problem of maximizing the present value of profits reduces to a problem of maximizing
profits in each period without considering the outcomes in other periods as in the Ramsey,
Cass and Koopmans model (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Therefore, the first–order
conditions characterizing an interior maximum for Π (t) are the following:
r (t) = αA (K (t) /u (t)H (t))α−1 (7)
wY (t) = (1− α)A (K (t) / (u (t)H (t)))
α (8)
(7) and (8) indicate that the firm chooses the ratio of physical to human capital in order
to equate the rental price of physical capital (i.e. the interest rate) to the marginal product
of capital and the wage rate to the marginal product of labor. This implies for the firm
zero profit in each period since factor payments exhaust total output.
2.3 Households behavior
We consider a closed economy inhabited by a constant population normalized to one. This
population is composed by identical infinitely–lived households that maximize the following
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intertemporal utility function:
∞∑
t=0
C (t)1−σ − 1
1− σ
ρt, ρ > 0, σ > 0 (9)
subject to the household flow budget constraint and human and social capital laws of
accumulation (4) and (3):
A (t+ 1) = r (t)A (t) + wY (t) u (t)H (t)− C (t)− IS (t) + (1− δ)A (t) (10)
H (t+ 1) = B ((1− u (t))H (t))β (S (t))1−β + (1− δ)H (t) (11)
S (t+ 1) = IS (t) + (1− δ)S (t) (12)
where ρ is a psychological discount factor that is inversely related to the rate of time
preference.3 The representative household must end up with 0 net debt. Therefore, since
the economy is closed we have A(t) = K(t). This implies that the household flow budget
constraint (10) reduces to expression (2), the law of motion of physical capital.
The first–order necessary conditions for this problem are the following:(
C (t+ 1)
C (t)
)σ
= ρ (1 + r (t+ 1)− δ) (13)
u (t) = u (t+ 1)
K (t)H (t+ 1)
K (t+ 1)H (t)
((
1 + r (t+ 1)− δ
1 + wH (t+ 1)− δ
)
(
1− u (t)
1− u (t+ 1)
S (t+ 1)H (t)
S (t)H (t+ 1)
)(1−β)) 1α
(14)
K (t)
S (t)
=
(
α
1− α
)(
β
1− β
)(
u (t)
1− u (t)
)
(15)
where wH (t) = Bβ (S (t) / (1− u (t))H (t))
1−β is the marginal productivity of human
capital in the educational sector. Equations (13) and (14) describe respectively the optimal
consumption and time allocation to final goods consumption. Equation (15) gives the
physical to social capital ratio at equilibrium.
2.4 Equilibrium
We now characterize the equilibrium of this economy. This is done in the following propo-
sition.
3The precise expression of the psychological discount factor ρ in terms of the rate of time preference ξ
is the following ρ = 1
1+ξ
.
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Proposition 1 (Equilibrium) Given the initial conditions K (−1), H (−1), and S (−1),
an equilibrium is a path {Y (t) ; IK (t) ;K (t) ;C (t) ; u (t) ;H (t) ; IS (t) ;S (t) ; r (t) ;wH (t)}t≥0
that satisfies the following conditions:(
C (t+ 1)
C (t)
)σ
= ρ (1 + r (t+ 1)− δ) (16)
u (t) = u (t+ 1)
K (t)H (t+ 1)
K (t+ 1)H (t)
((
1 + r (t+ 1)− δ
1 + wH (t+ 1)− δ
)
(
1− u (t)
1− u (t+ 1)
S (t+ 1)H (t)
S (t)H (t+ 1)
)(1−β)) 1α
(17)
r (t) = αA (K (t) /H (t))α−1 u (t)1−α (18)
wH (t) = Bβ (S (t) / (1− u (t))H (t))
1−β (19)
K (t)
S (t)
=
(
α
1− α
)(
β
1− β
)(
u (t)
1− u (t)
)
(20)
Y (t) = A (K (t))α (u (t)H (t))1−α (21)
Y (t) = C (t) + IK (t) + IS (t) (22)
K (t+ 1) = IK (t) + (1− δ)K (t) (23)
H (t+ 1) = B ((1− u (t))H (t))β (S (t))1−β + (1− δ)H (t) (24)
S (t+ 1) = IS (t) + (1− δ)S (t) (25)
Equations (23), (24) and (25) are the accumulation rules of respectively physical, human
and social capital. Equations (16)–(25), together with the usual transversality conditions:
lim
T→∞
K (T ) ρT = 0 (26)
lim
T→∞
H (T ) ρT = 0 (27)
lim
T→∞
S (T ) ρT = 0, (28)
are sufficient for an optimum.
The proof of proposition 1 is given in Appendix A. In this proof, the household in-
tertemporal optimization problem depicted by (9), (10), (11) and (12) is solved explicitly.
Solving this problem implies the optimization of the following expression of the current
value Hamiltonian:
J =
(C (t))1−σ − 1
1− σ
ρt + λ1 (t+ 1)
(
AK (t)α (u (t)H (t))1−α − C (t)− IS (t)− δK (t)
)
+ λ2 (t+ 1)
(
B ((1− u (t))H (t))β S (t)1−β − δH (t)
)
+ λ3 (t+ 1) (IS (t)− δS (t))
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We can draw two standard results from this optimization: firstly, household ’s intertemporal
optimization with respect to consumption and investment in social capital (equations (45)
and (46)) implies that
C (t)−σ = λ1 (t+ 1) = λ3 (t+ 1) .
This entails the fact that on the margin goods must be equally valuable in their three uses:
consumption, physical capital accumulation and social capital accumulation. Secondly, the
household ’s intertemporal optimization with respect to the control variable u (t) (equation
(47)) yields:
p (t+ 1) =
λ2 (t+ 1)
λ1 (t+ 1)
=
A (1− α) (K (t) / (u (t)H (t)))α
Bβ (S (t) / ((1− u (t))H (t)))1−β
⇔ (29)
λ2 (t+ 1)Bβ (S (t) / ((1− u (t))H (t)))
1−β = λ1 (t+ 1)A (1− α) (K (t) / (u (t)H (t)))
α(30)
where p (t+ 1) denotes the shadow price of human capital in terms of final goods.
(29) ensures that the marginal productivity of human capital is equalized across sectors.
(30) expresses the condition that time is on the margin equally valuable in its two uses,
production and human capital accumulation. Therefore, this is equivalent to equalization
of returns of human capital across sectors.
2.5 Balanced growth paths
We now come to the study of balanced growth path (BGP) regimes. As usual, a balanced
growth path is a particular solution to the equilibrium dynamics system displayed above
where all variables grow at a constant rate except r (t), wH (t) and u (t) which should be
constant along this path. For human capital we have H (t+ 1) = H (t) (1 + γH). The
growth rates of the variables Y (t), IK (t), K (t), C (t), IS (t), S (t) are respectively γY , γIK ,
γK , γC , γK , γC , γIS , and γS. We first show that in our model with social capital all growing
variables along the BGP should have the same growth path.
Proposition 2 If H (t) grows at a rate γ∗H > 0, then all the other variables IK (t), K (t),
C (t), IS (t), S (t) grow at strictly positive rates with:
γ∗Y = γ
∗
H = γ
∗
K = γ
∗
IK
= γ∗C = γ
∗
S = γ
∗
IS
(31)
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix B.
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Next we have to determine γH . To this end we need to impose restrictions on the long–
run levels. Computing these restrictions from the dynamic system (16)–(25) we end up with
8 equations for 9 unknowns
{
Y¯ ; K¯; C¯; u¯; H¯; I¯K ; I¯S; S¯; γH
}
. Therefore, the system in terms of
levels is undetermined, which is a usual property of endogenous growth models. However,
it is possible to stationarize this system to get rid of this indeterminacy. To do so we
rewrite the dynamic system (13)–(25) as a function of the following six stationary variables:
y (t) = Y (t) /H (t), k (t) = K (t) /H (t), ik (t) = IK (t) /H (t), c (t) = C (t) /H (t), s (t) =
S (t) /H (t), is (t) = IS (t) /H (t), u (t) and γH . The stationarized dynamic system is given
in Appendix C. With such a stationnarized system, we are able to discuss the existence and
uniqueness of the steady state growth rate, and its main determinants as well. As we shall
see hereafter, the introduction of social capital crucially changes the comparative statics
of the steady state growth rate relative to the Lucas-Uzawa benchmark. In particular,
(permanent) technological shocks in the final good sector affect the growth rate in the
presence of social capital (as modeled in our paper) while it definitely does not in the
Lucas-Uzawa case. This is discussed in the following section.
2.6 Steady state growth rate: the role of social capital
Solving the aforementioned stationarized system, and after many tedious computations (see
Appendix C), it is possible to identify a closed-form solution to the steady state growth
rate. Specifically, one gets the following result.
Proposition 3 (Existence and uniqueness) Let B >
(
1
Ψ
)1−β (1
ρ
+ δ − 1
) 2−(α+β)
1−α
. Then,
an unique positive steady state growth rate exists and is characterized by the following stable
and positive long–run value:
γ∗H =
(
ρ
(
1− δ +
(
B
1
1−βΨ
) (1−α)(1−β)
2−(α+β)
)) 1
σ
− 1 (32)
with Ψ = (Aα)
1
1−α
(1−α)
α
(1−β)
β
β
1
1−β
Proposition 3 suggests that provided that the education sector is productive enough,
there exists a unique steady state growth rate. Because the sectors are heavily inter-related,
the expression of the growth rate is much more complicated than the counterpart in the
benchmark Lucas-Uzawa model. But in both cases, the growth rate is positive provided
productivity in the education sector is large enough. In the model with social capital,
the growth rate is a complicated function of many parameters, including the technology
14
parameters in the final good sector: this makes a significant difference with the Lucas-
Uzawa model (see algebraic details below). This is a desirable property of social capital
which essential role is to facilitate the connection between the different activity sectors. As
modeled here, social capital is the vehicle through which productivity improvements in the
final good sector may also have a positive impact in the education sector: the resulting
positive wealth effect is likely to increase investment in social capital, therefore boosting
growth in the education sector.
We may perform comparative statics to check out the impact of the model’s parameters
on the balanced growth path. Unfortunately, the expressions involved are so complex that
it turns out to be impossible to obtain the comparative statics analytically except for the
psychological discount factor (standard negative effects of impatience on the long-term
growth rate). The same can be claimed on the other expressions obtained in the BGP, like
the equilibrium allocation of human capital to the final good sector, the ratios physical to
human capital and social to human capital respectively:
u∗ = 1−
β (γ∗ + δ)
(1 + γ∗)σ 1
ρ
− 1 + δ
(33)
k∗ = u∗
(
Aα
(1 + γ∗)σ 1
ρ
− 1 + δ
) 1
1−α
(34)
s∗ = (γ∗ + δ)


(
(1 + γ∗)σ 1
ρ
− 1 + δ
)β
Bββ


1
1−β
. (35)
We shall obtain the comparative statics numerically in Section 3 once the model conve-
niently calibrated. At this stage, we move for comparison with the benchmark Lucas-Uzawa
model.
2.7 Comparison with the Lucas–Uzawa’ model
With β → 1, there is no payoff of accumulating social capital since it contributes neither
to physical capital nor to human capital accumulation. Therefore, the model reduces to
Lucas–Uzawa’ framework without externality as there is no social capital accumulation and
the production functions from (1) and (4) simplify to:
Y (t) = A (K (t))α (u (t)H (t))1−α = C (t) + IK (t) (36)
H (t+ 1) = B (1− u (t))H (t) + (1− δ)H (t) (37)
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It can be readily verified that the dynamic optimization of Lucas–Uzawa’ model yields
the following expressions of the steady state growth rate, the share of human capital allo-
cated to physical capital accumulation and the physical to human capital ratio:
γ∗lu = (ρ (1− δ + B))
1
σ − 1 (38)
u∗lu = 1−
γ∗lu + δ
B
(39)
k∗lu = u
∗
lu
(
Aα
B
) 1
1−α
(40)
In contrast to our model with social capital, the steady state growth rate is unaffected
by parameters of the final goods production function such as the productivity constant
A (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) and the physical capital elasticity α. In our model
productivity shocks in any of the two sectors raise the economy’s ability to accumulate more
social capital, therefore fostering human capital accumulation and ultimately economic
growth. In the classical Lucas–Uzawa’s model, only direct productivity shocks in the
education sector can do the job.
Proposition 4 (Impact of A and α on γH) In contrast to the Lucas–Uzawa special case,
the BGP growth rate γ∗H is sensitive to productivity shocks in the final goods sector and to
changes in the physical capital elasticity.
The same remark can be done on the share of human capital in the final good sector and
physical to human capital ratios along the BGP. Comparison of equations (38) and (39) with
equations (33) and (34) speaks by itself. Only the productivity parameter in the education
sector, B is relevant in the long-run for the latter magnitudes in the Lucas-Uzawa case while
the presence of social capital in our model provides the necessary vehicle for technology
improvements in the final good sector to matter in the long-run for these magnitudes. In
this sense, our modelling exemplifies the role of social capital in the development process.
Note that this result is sensitive to the assumption made about the cost of social capital
accumulation. Assuming that social capital accumulation implies an opportunity cost in
terms of foregone consumption or physical capital investment entails a direct link between
the two sectors which materialized in the expression of the steady state growth rate. An
alternative modelling strategy implying that the cost of human capital accumulation is
incurred in terms of human capital would entail a thoroughly different result as shown
in Appendix E. Indeed, as can be seen in (84) the expression of the growth rate in this
alternative model does not depend of the parameters of the final goods production function
A and α.
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2.8 BGP growth rate and factor intensity of social capital in the
education sector
An interesting side product of our BGP analysis is the evolution of the growth rate when
the education sector becomes more and more intensive in social capital, that’s when β
decreases. The analysis of the function form of γ∗H shows that it is continuous in β on the
interval ] 0, 1 [ . Moreover, we have:
lim
β→0
γ∗H =
(
ρ
((
(1− α)α
α
1−αB
(
A
1
1−α
)) 1−α
2−α
− δ + 1
)) 1
σ
− 1
lim
β→1
γ∗H = (ρ (1− δ + B))
1
σ − 1 = γ∗lu
A careful examination of the steady state growth rate first and second derivatives yields
the following results:
lim
β→0
dγH
dβ
= −∞, lim
β→1
dγH
dβ
= +∞, lim
β→0
d2γH
d2β
= +∞, and lim
β→1
d2γH
d2β
= +∞
Since dγH
dβ
(β) is also continuous in β on ] 0, 1 [ , then the equation dγH
dβ
(β) = 0 should admit
at least one solution in that interval. Therefore, the steady state growth rate is a non–
monotonic function of the elasticity of human capital in the education sector. One can
easily find numerical examples when the first derivative is always increasing, i.e. d
2γH
d2β
> 0
for β ∈ ] 0, 1 [ . In such cases, the human capital steady growth rate displays an inverted–U
shape curve. 4
Three comments are in order here. First of all, it is important to notice that having the
education sector more intensive in social capital is good for long-run growth: in our model,
as social capital is produced from the final good and not from human capital (reflecting the
hypothesis that it builds more on time diverted from production than on specific human
capital), the economy has two ways to stimulate growth, either through social capital or
human capital, instead of one in the Lucas-Uzawa model. The more important is social
capital in the education sector, the larger the long-term growth attainable. Second, this
property is not true when β is close to one: when one starts departing from the Lucas-Uzawa
model, the growth rate first decreases. It only increases (when β keeps decreasing) when β
is low enough. As a consequence, there must be another mechanism counter-balancing the
one mentioned just above, the interaction of both being responsible of the non-monotonic
picture encountered. A potential opposite mechanism is the following: as β goes down, the
4Figures 2 and 3 illustrate such an example with the following baseline parameters: δ=0.05, ρ=0.98,
σ=2, α=0.3, A=1, B=0.12273.
17
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Β
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
ΓH
Figure 2: Human capital’s growth rate as a function of β.
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Figure 3: Human capital’s growth rate derivative as a function of β.
education sector relies less on human capital (and more on social capital), therefore the
share of human capital in this sector is likely to decrease,5 which causes the growth rate to
drop. In the neighborhood of the Lucas-Uzawa model, that when β is not too distant from
1, the latter mechanism dominates and the BGP growth rate drops when β goes down. As
β continues to decreases, this mechanism gets dominated by the first one (the availability
of a second powerful growth engine, social capital). Such a monotonic pattern may also
5This specific effect is corroborated in the next numerical section.
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be observed in the model presented in Appendix E (cfr Figure 7), where the cost of social
capital accumulation is expressed in terms of human capital. Last but not least, even under
the restriction 1 − α < β, ensuring that the education sector is more intensive in “pure”
human capital than the final good sector, the non-monotonicity property still holds.6
3 Numerical exercises
Let us consider the following calibration of the model. A first set of parameters is fixed
a priori to what we view as reasonable values given the available empirical evidence (see
Table 1). The rate of depreciation of all the forms of capital is set to 5%. The psychological
discount factor is 0.98. The absolute value of the elasticity of marginal utility is 2. A,
the total factor productivity of the goods and services sector, is normalized to 1. B, the
productivity parameter of the education sector is set to 0.12273, in order to obtain a growth
rate of 2%. While the values of most of the parameters are calibrated on the basis of the
Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
Rate of depreciation of capital δ 0.05
Psychological discount factor ρ 0.98
Absolute value of the elasticity of marginal utility σ 2
Physical capital share in the final sector α 0.3
Total productivity in the final sector A 1
Total productivity in the education sector B 0.12273
Human capital share in the education sector β 0.9
existing empirical studies, it is quite impossible to calibrate β in that way. Indeed, one
can hardly find in the literature information about the elasticity of either social or human
capital in the education sector. To circumvent that difficulty, we perform a structural
estimation of (4), the law of accumulation of human capital.
6In Figure 2, α = 0.3, non-monotonicity arises in the β-interval, ]0.7 1].
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3.1 Estimation of the elasticity of social capital
To simplify our specification, we assume full depreciation of human capital, that is δ = 1
and obtain
gH (t) = B (1− u (t))
β
(
S (t)
H (t)
)1−β
(41)
where gH (t) = 1 + γH (t) is the growth factor. Taking the logs of both sides of (41),
assuming that B = B¯eǫ and that the economies are in the steady state so that Proposition
(2) implies γ∗Y = γ
∗
H = γ
∗
K = γ
∗
IK
= γ∗C = γ
∗
S = γ
∗
IS
= γ∗ , we may write:
log (g∗) = log
(
B¯
)
+ βlog (1− u∗) + (1− β) log
(
S
H
∗
)
+ ǫ (42)
The specification (42) implies that the sum of the coefficients of the regressors is equal
to 1. To be consistent with our theoretical model we may assume that this restriction holds.
In that case, the estimation of (42) is equivalent to estimating:
log
(
g∗H
S
)
= log
(
B¯
)
+ βlog
(
(1− u∗)H
S
)
+ ǫ (43)
Therefore, we may estimate β through a simple regression model by regressing the
logarithm of the product of the steady state growth rate and the human to social capital
ratio on a constant and the logarithm of the product of the fraction of time the human
capital factor devotes to educational sector and the inverse of the normalized social capital.7
The steady state growth rate is proxied by data on GDP per–capita growth adjusted
for purchasing power parity (PPP, expressed in constant 2000 US Dollars). Those growth
rates are computed on the basis on data on real GDP per capita from the Penn World
Tables 6.2 between 1980 and 2000 (More information on the data sources is provided on
Appendix F). Since yearly data on GDP per capita may incorporate short–run disturbances,
real GDP per capita rates averaged over five–year periods and growth rates are computed.
More precisely, we compute growth rates for the following period: 1980–1985, 1985–1990,
1990–1995 and 1995–2000.
Data for social capital are obtained from the World Values Surveys.8 According to
previous researches on social capital at macro level, social capital can be measured through
7It is obvious that it would have been better to use more sophisticated methods, such that those proposed
by Panel data econometrics, to estimate the human capital elasticity. But, the significant amount of missing
data in the social capital indicators prevents it.
8Detailed information on the World Values Survey may be obtained on
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
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different indicators: the levels of generalized trust, associational activity and norms of civic
behavior. Trust is coded from WVS data as the percentage of respondents answering that
most people can be trusted when asked “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” (Inglehart
et al., 2000; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Paxton, 1999; Paxton, 2002; Uslaner, 1999; Alesina
and La Ferrara, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Whiteley, 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001; Delhey and
Newton, 2005).
Associational activity is the percentage of people involved in the following organizations
or activities: social welfare services for elderly; handicapped or deprived people; education,
arts, music or cultural activities; local community action on issues like poverty, employment,
housing, racial equality; third world development or human rights; youth work; religious
or church organizations; sports or recreation; Peace movement; Voluntary organizations
concerned with health.
Other associations or activities like political parties, labor unions or professional orga-
nizations are discarded since they seem to refer predominantly to organizations generally
oriented towards redistributive goals at the exclusive benefit of their members.
Following Knack and Keefer (1997), the strength of the indicator of norms of civic
behavior is evaluated from responses to question about whether each of the following be-
haviors:“claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled”, “avoiding a fare on
public transport”, “cheating on taxes if you have a chance”, “keeping money that you have
found”, “failing to report damage you’ve done accidentally to a parked vehicle” can always
be justified, never be justified or something in between.
There are several ways to construct an indicator of social capital: we may either consider
separately measures of trust, of norms and of participation in networks or we may combine
different measures of social capital in an unique social capital index. This unique social
capital index can be built from the different measures of social through principal component
analysis. Then, we retain the first principal component which account for the highest
share of the total variance of a set of social capital variables. The problem with principal
components is that they take negative values which are not convenient for logarithmic
transformation. We circumvent this difficulty by considering a monotonic transformation
of the first principal component: the Cumulative Normal Distribution Function. This allows
us to obtain a social capital index with values between 0 and 1.
Our model needs an approximation for the time spent by individuals to build up human
capital accumulation, (1− u∗). For this, we use the ratio of the average years of schooling
to life expectancy). For average years of schooling data we take Barro and Lee (2000)’ data
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about the educational attainment of the total population aged 15 and over. Data for life
expectancy are taken from the World Bank. We consider data for 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995,
and 2000. Following Fo¨ldvari and Van Leeuwen (2009), we consider that (1−u∗) is roughly
equal to the share of time allocated to education and learning. Thus, “dividing this by the
life expectancy yields the share of the representative agent’s life that is devoted to human
capital formation by means of education” (Fo¨ldvari and Van Leeuwen, 2009).
We get the following results: when social capital is measured as trust, or as a combined
measure of trust and civic norms, we obtain an estimate of β, of roughly 100%. Such results
appear as a confirmation of the Lucas–Uzawa model where human capital is the only factor
that plays a role in its own accumulation. They seem to suggest that social capital do not
impact human capital formation, although this measure of social capital have been shown
to impact positively the growth rate of the economy (Knack and Keefer, 1998; Temple,
2000; Fukuyama, 2002).
When social capital is measured by the indicator of norms and civic behavior, we obtain
a value of the elasticity of human capital in the education of 94% which implies an elasticity
of social capital of roughly 6%. Those ways of measuring social capital allow to enough
degrees of freedoms in the estimation (68 observations for trust, 62 observations for norms
and for the combined measure of trust and norms). However, considering only norms and
trust alone does not seem to be the most intuitive way to capture social capital. While
norms and trust are pertinent dimensions of social, they are not sufficient to capture all the
aspects of the polymorphous concept of social capital. Considering associational activity
may allow us to broaden the perception of that concept. Yet, this implies a severe drawback:
the degree of freedoms decreases sharply.
Measuring social capital exclusively as associational activity implies a value of β of 0.89
and a number of used observations egal to 29. Combining trust, norms and associational
activity in a single indicator, we obtain 0.90 as the OLS estimate of the elasticity of human
capital in the education sector. In the simulation, we will consider 0.90 as our value of
β. This implies an elasticity of social capital in the educational sector of 10%. There is
obviously an issue of endogeneity with this OLS estimate. Indeed, one may expect that the
level of output growth rate may affect the choice of the inputs of the educational sector. To
tackle that problem, we use values of regressors measured at the beginning of the period
on which the growth rates are evaluated (Knack and Keefer, 1997).
To end this subsection, let us just indicate that with β = 0.9 and with the other values
of parameters indicated in table 1, we are in the neighborhood of the Lucas-Uzawa model
(cfr. Figure 2). Therefore, in this parameters region the second mechanism mentioned in
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subsection 2.8 is at play: as β goes up, the education sector relies more on human capital
and less on social capital. Thus, the share of human capital in this sector as well as the
human to social capital ratio rise, which cause the growth rate to increase. Such a pattern is
consistent with Putnam (2000)’s finding according to which social capital has been declining
in the US, although the economy has been growing.
3.2 Numerical comparative statics of the BGPs
As mentioned in Section 2.6, the comparative statics of the BGPs cannot be obtained
analytically except for the psychological discount factor. For this parameter, we find the
standard and expected result that the higher is the psychological discount factor ρ (i.e. the
lower the rate of time preference or equivalently the more people value future consumption),
the higher is the long–run growth rate. Table 2 includes the numerical comparative statics
with respect to other parameters and for other variables than the BGP growth rate. The
computations are performed on the baseline described above.
Table 2: Comparative statics: general model.
γ∗H u
∗ k∗ s∗
A + + + +
B + + + -
α - + + +
β - - + -
ρ + - - +
δ - - - +
σ -1 + + -
Baseline 0.0200 0.4335 1.7893 0.6062
Notes:
1 Holds if ρ
(
1− δ +
(
B
1
1−β Ψ
) (1−α)(1−β)
2−(α+β)
)
> 1. The red signs are displayed when it is impossible to uniquely sign
the derivatives through an analytic inspection. Then, they are determined from the evaluation of the derivatives of the steady
state values arrayed vertically with respect to the parameters arrayed horizontally.
Some comments are in order. In first place, and as suggested in Section 6, technological
shocks in the final good sector do foster long-term growth in our model with social capital.
An increase in A does raise the BGP share of human capital in the final good sector and
the ratios physical to human capital, and social to human capital as well, which is the
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intuitive outcome. An increase in B, that’s a productivity boom in the education sector,
has the same qualitative properties except that it raises human capital more than social
capital, which is again intuitively acceptable. The obtained impact of B-shocks on the
ratio physical to human capital is standard (see the Lucas-Uzawa case below). Second, a
decrease in β is found to increase growth: we are in a parametric region where making the
education sector more intensive in social capital triggers long-term growth. Note also that
decreasing β increases the share of human capital in the final good sector. This corroborates
our interpretation of the non-monotonicity feature in Section 2.8, and more precisely, our
identification of the reverse mechanism playing through the human capital share decision
variable. In this sense, the obtained numerical comparative statics are completely consistent
with the intuitions presented so far.
The benchmark Lucas-Uzawa case In order to highlight the role of social capital in the
findings above, we present here the counterpart comparative statics on the Lucas-Uzawa
model.
Table 3: Comparative statics: Lucas–Uzawa model.
γ∗H u
∗ k∗
A 0 0 +
B + + -
α 0 0 +3
ρ + - -
δ - -2 -2
σ -1 +1 +1
Baseline 0.0255 0.3846 1.3791
Notes:
1 Holds if ρ (1− δ +B) > 1. 2 Holds if ρ (1− δ +B) > 1 and σ > 1. 3 Holds if
(
1− α+ α log
(
αA
B
))
> 0.
As in table 2 the red signs are determined from the evaluation of the derivatives of the steady state values arrayed vertically
with respect to the parameters arrayed horizontally evaluated with the following baseline parameters: δ=0.05, ρ=0.98, σ=2,
α=0.3, A=1, B=0.12273.
Comparison of the two tables confirm the main and essential difference between the two
models: while technology shocks in the final good sector do not play any role in the BGP
in the Lucas-Uzawa model, they do matter when social capital is modelled. Other than
this, the comparative statics of the two models are qualitatively similar.
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3.3 Productivity shocks
By propositions 3 and 4, we know that productivity parameters impact positively the
growth rate of the economy. This is one of the important differences between our model
and the standard Lucas-Uzawa model where productivity parameters of the final good
sector have no impact in the long run growth. In what follow, we analyze how an economy
responds to shocks to the parameters, A (the productivity in the final good sector), and
B (the productivity in the education sector). All the shocks considered are permanent
(from t = 0) and have an intensity equal to 1%. Shocks to these parameters can arise
due to changes in education policy, to education subsidies, to changes in policy regimes, to
innovation, etc...
3.3.1 Productivity shocks in the goods and services sector
In response to a productivity shock in the final goods sector, standardized physical capital
increases to take advantage of the increased efficiency of the productive sector (Figure 4).
Depending on the value of the human capital elasticity in the education sector, the share of
human capital allocated in the goods and services sector may initially increase (for β = 1 or
β = 0.9, Figure 8 in Appendix G) or decrease (for β = 0.5, Figure 9 in Appendix G). In the
first case this implies a reallocation of human capital from the education to the productive
sector, while this would entail a reassignment of human capital from the final goods to the
educative sector in the second case.
As the marginal productivity of human capital in the education sector rises with so-
cial capital, human and social capitals are complements in human capital accumulation.
Therefore, the demand for social capital in the education sector decreases in the first case,
while it raises in the second case (Figure 4). But as the education sector is the driver of
economic growth, it also entails a smaller human capital accumulation, an initial decline of
the economic growth rate in the first case (Figure 9 in Appendix G) and an initial increase
in the second case (Figure 10 in Appendix G). In the first case, the resulting paucity of
human capital induces agents to devote less time in the productive sector. This entails a
reverse reallocation of human capital from the productive to the education sector and a
subsequent rise of the demand of social capital and of the economic growth rate. A reverse
mechanism occurs in the second case.
The intensity of the elasticity of human capital in the education sector is of fundamental
importance in the way the economy adjust in case of productivity shocks. For values of
β close to one, human and social capital are less substitutable as inputs of the education
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sector. Therefore, in case of a raise of A the reallocation of human capital from the education
to the final goods sector entails an initial drop-off of the growth rate. With β << 1, the
substitutability between the two inputs of the education sector increases.9 Therefore, the
reallocation of human capital to the final goods sector can be accommodated by an increase
of the social to human capital ratio.
9A property of the Cobb-Douglas production function of the education sector is that the inputs involved
are complements since no human capital accumulation is possible when the stock of either of them is zero.
But, at the same time they are substitutable since human capital accumulation may be kept constant while
the decrease in the stock of one of the imput is compensated by the increase of the stock of the other. The
substitutability between human and social capital increases when β << 1.
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3.3.2 Productivity shocks in the education sector
Let us now consider the impact of a shock in the education sector. As before, depending
on the intensity of the elasticity of human capital, we may distinguish two cases. If β is
close to 1, then human capital growth rate increases (Figures 12 and 13 in Appendix H).
As the education sector is more efficient, workers reallocate their working time in its favor
(Figure 11 in Appendix H). Since human and physical capital are complements, this lowers
the physical to human capital ratio (Figure 5).
Human capital and social capital are complements as well, therefore standardized social
capital also increases in a first step (Figure 5). But, the reallocation of working time in favor
of the education sector ends up by causing a shortage of physical capital investment. To
avoid detrimental effects on output and economic growth rate, agents opt to subsequently
spend more time in the productive sector.
In the case β << 1, once again the substitutability between social and human capital
increases. Therefore, agents take advantage of the income effect generated by the increased
productivity of the education sector by increasing their working time in the final goods
sector (Figure 12). As human and social capital are complements, this induces an initial
decrease of the social to human capital ratio (Figure 5). This has initially a detrimental
effect on the human capital growth rate. However, it subsequently increases as agents
increase their working time in the education sector.
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3.4 Imbalance effects
The analysis of imbalance effects represent an important line of research in endogenous
growth models with human capital. They are due either to the relative abundance of phys-
ical capital10 or inversely to the relative abundance of human capital. The most important
result that can be derived in analyzing the imbalance effects in the Lucas-Uzawa model is
that a shortage of human capital motivates an allocation of resources to production of goods
rather than education. This will decrease the accumulation of human capital, lowering the
economy’s growth rate (Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit, 1995). Thus, the model predicts
that an economy should experience faster recovery after an event that destroys physical
capital, than if it had destroyed human capital. It also suggests that the economies which
are growing faster are those with higher ratios of human capital to physical capital.
Contrary to the one sector model with the same technology to produce physical and
human capital, the two-sector model does not give rise to symmetric U-shaped imbalance
effects. The rational behind this finding is quite simple: since the education sector is more
intensive in human capital, its operation cost is larger in case of a shortfall of human capital
because of the induced higher wage. This motivates people to allocate human capital to
the final good sector, rather to the education sector (Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit, 2004
and 2008, Boucekkine et al., 2008).
Imbalances effects are depicted in Figure 6. Figure 6 shows that the relationship between
the human capital growth rate and the physical to human capital ratio is always monotonic.
However, depending on the human capital elasticity β, it can have a negative (when β = 0.5)
or a positive slope (when β = 0.9 or β = 1). Indeed, as stated before when the elasticity of
human capital in the education sector is high, social capital is less substitutable to human
capital. Therefore, individuals allocate more working time in the education sector which
allows a higher accumulation of human capital and therefore a higher economic growth rate.
Consequently, since there is less human capital available in the final goods sector, firms use
proportionally more physical capital which explains the positive relationship between the
economic growth rate and the physical to human capital ratio.
A contrario, when β = 0.5, the substitutability between social and human capital in-
creases, therefore individuals may allocate more working time in the final goods sector
without impeding economic growth. Therefore, lower physical to human capital ratio co-
exist with higher economic growth rates as suggests by the negative slope of the curve in
Figure 6 corresponding to β = 0.5.
10or equivalently to the shortage of human capital.
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Figure 6: Comparison of different Physical to Human capital ratio imbalance effects for
different values of the elasticity of the human capital in the education sector (β = 1 (Lucas-
Uzawa model), β = 0.9, β = 0.5).
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we build an endogenous two-sector model where the interaction between
human and social capital drive the accumulation of human capital. First of all, we choose
a multi-sector modelling such that social capital plays the advocated role of timing belt
propagating shocks through the macroeconomy. As a result, and in contrast to the seminal
Lucas-Uzawa model, the steady state growth rate depends on productivity parameters
of ALL the sectors, not only those arising from the education sector. Assuming that
any investment in social capital implies an opportunity cost in terms of foregone physical
capital accumulation and consumption creates a direct link between the two sectors which
materializes in the expression of the steady state growth rate.
Three types of findings are obtained in this paper. First of all, it is shown that the
presence of social capital has an ambiguous effect on long-term growth. Indeed, we obtain
a U-shape pattern for the steady state growth rate with respect to social capital elasticity
in the education sector. When the education sector is intensive in social capital, the latter
may act as a substitute of human capital. This allows a higher allocation of human capital
in the final goods sector and therefore enable the economy to achieve higher output, higher
consumption level, and higher investment in social capital which recursively may sustain
a higher economic growth rate. However, in the neighborhood of the Lucas-Uzawa model,
when the social capital elasticity is much lower, the education sector relies less on social
capital. Therefore, in such a case the only way to foster economic growth is through in-
creases of the human to social capital ratio. Such a parameter region is consistent with a
strong empirical result uncovered by Putnam (2000) on the US economy: the concommit-
tance of a growing economy with a declining social to human capital ratio. Second, we try
to provide with some estimate for the “weight” of social capital in the process of human
capital formation. Our main finding in this respect is that the elasticity of human capital
to social capital varies from 6% to 10% depending on the measure of social capital selected.
Last but not least, through some numerical examples, we show that the magnitude of social
capital elasticity may have a strong impact on transitory dynamics. A higher social capital
elasticity may induce a decreasing pattern of the steady state growth with respect to the
physical to human capital ratio, while lower values may entail an increasing pattern.
It goes without saying that our analysis has the advantages and limits of multi-sector
endogenous growth models, which build on stylized laws of motion for aggregate variables.
The process of social capital formation is probably much trickier at the micro level. How-
ever we believe that our model highlights in a transparent and accurate way the role of
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social capital in the growth process, and this role is indeed ambiguous. We have uncovered
the sources of this ambiguity and provided a numerical assessment of the impact of social
capital on long-term growth and short-term dynamics using available data on social cap-
ital measures. More work is needed on the microfoundations of social capital and on its
measurement.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
The households’ intertemporal optimization problem yields the following discrete time cur-
rent value Hamiltonian:
J =
(C (t))1−σ − 1
1− σ
ρt + λ1 (t+ 1)
(
AK (t)α (u (t)H (t))1−α − C (t)− IS (t)− δK (t)
)
+ λ2 (t+ 1)
(
B ((1− u (t))H (t))β S (t)1−β − δH (t)
)
+ λ3 (t+ 1) (IS (t)− δS (t))(44)
where λ1 (t), λ2 (t), λ3 (t) respectively denote are the K (t), H (t) and S (t) co-state vari-
ables. We consider that the households fully internalize the benefit of social capital. the
necessary first order conditions are:
∂J
∂C (t)
= 0⇒ C (t)−σ = λ1 (t+ 1) (45)
∂J
∂IS (t)
= 0⇒ λ1 (t+ 1) = λ3 (t+ 1) (46)
∂J
∂u (t)
= 0⇒
λ1 (t+ 1)
λ2 (t+ 1)
=
AK (t)α (1− α) u (t)−αH (t)1−α
Bβ (1− u (t))β−1H (t)βS (t)1−β
(47)
∂J
∂K (t)
= − (λ1 (t+ 1)− λ1 (t))⇒
λ1 (t)
λ1 (t+ 1)
= 1 + AαK (t)α−1 (u (t)H (t))1−α − δ (48)
∂J
∂H (t)
= − (λ2 (t+ 1)− λ2 (t))⇒
λ2 (t)
λ2 (t+ 1)
= 1 +
λ1 (t+ 1)
λ2 (t+ 1)
AK (t)αu (t)1−α (1− α)H (t)−α
+Bβ (1− u (t))β H (t)β−1S (t)1−β − δ (49)
∂J
∂S (t)
= − (λ3 (t+ 1)− λ3 (t))⇒
λ3 (t)
λ3 (t+ 1)
= 1 +
λ2 (t+ 1)
λ3 (t+ 1)
B ((1− u (t))H (t))β (1− β)S (t)−β − δ (50)
Our boundaries conditions are standard. They imply the initial values K (−1), H (−1),
S (−1) and the following transversality conditions:
lim
T→∞
K (T ) ρT = 0
lim
T→∞
H (T ) ρT = 0
lim
T→∞
S (T ) ρT = 0
36
After some manipulation on equation (45), we obtain the following Euler equation on the
consumption control variable:(
C (t+ 1)
C (t)
)σ
= ρ
(
1 + AαK (t+ 1)α−1 (u (t+ 1)H (t+ 1))1−α − δ
)
Equating the growth rates of λ1 (t) and λ3 (t) (cfr. equations (46), (48) and (50)), we obtain
after further manipulations the following relationship between K (t) and S (t):
K (t)
S (t)
=
(
α
1− α
)(
β
1− β
)(
u (t)
1− u (t)
)
From (47) giving the ratio of costates variables λ1 (t) and λ2 (t), we can compute the ratio
of their growth rates; this yields the second Euler equation on u (t):
u (t) = u (t+ 1)
k (t)
k (t+ 1)
((
1 + Aαk (t+ 1)(α−1)u (t+ 1)(1−α) − δ
1 + Bβ(1− u (t+ 1))(β−1)s (t+ 1)(1−β) − δ
)
(
1− u (t)
1− u (t+ 1)
s (t+ 1)
s (t)
)(1−β)) 1α
with k (t) = K(t)
H(t)
and s (t) = S(t)
H(t)
. The other conditions of the equilibrium are merely accu-
mulation rules of physical, human and social capital or final goods equilibrium conditions.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
If a balanced growth path should satisfy the eight Equations (16)–(25), then one should
have the following eight restrictions among the various growth rates:
(1 + γ∗C)
σ = ρ (1 + r∗ − δ) (51)
1 + γ∗K
1 + γ∗H
=
(
1 + γ∗S
1 + γ∗H
) 1−β
α
(52)
γ∗K = γ
∗
S (53)
1 + γ∗Y = (1 + γ
∗
K)
α (1 + γ∗H)
1−α (54)
γ∗Y = γ
∗
C = γ
∗
IK
= γ∗IS (55)
1 + γ∗K =
IK
K
∗
+ 1− δ (56)
1 + γ∗H = w
∗
H/β + 1− δ (57)
1 + γ∗S =
IS
S
∗
+ 1− δ (58)
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(52) and (53) implies that γ∗K = γ
∗
H . As γ
∗
K and γ
∗
H are constant we may conclude from
(56) and (58) that K and IK on one hand and S and IS on another hand grow at the same
rate. Therefore, we have the following relationship:
γ∗Y = γ
∗
H = γ
∗
K = γ
∗
IK
= γ∗C = γ
∗
S = γ
∗
IS
= γ∗
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3
At the steady state the growth rate of the costate variables λ1 (t) and λ2 (t) are equal. From
this equality, we derive that the marginal productivity of K(t) in the final goods sector, r∗
and the margin productivity of H(t) in the education sector are equal in the steady state
r∗ = w∗H . Then, from (51) and (57) we may derive the steady state value of time allocation
of human capital to the final goods sector:
u∗ = 1−
β (γ∗ + δ)
(1 + γ∗)σ 1
ρ
− 1 + δ
(59)
Replacing this expression in (51) and (57), we obtain the following steady state values of
stationnarized physical and social capital:
K
H
∗
= u∗
(
Aα
(1 + γ∗)σ 1
ρ
− 1 + δ
) 1
1−α
(60)
S
H
∗
= (γ∗ + δ)


(
(1 + γ∗)σ 1
ρ
− 1 + δ
)β
Bββ


1
1−β
(61)
Replacing the expression of the ratio of (60) and (61) in the leftside of (51) yields, after
some straightforward computations, (32) the expression of the steady state growth rate.
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Appendix D: The stationarized dynamic system
The dynamic system (16)–(25) can be rewritten in terms of stationary variables as:(
c (t+ 1) (1 + γ (t+ 1))
c (t)
)σ
= ρ (1 + r (t+ 1)− δ) (62)
u (t) = u (t+ 1)
k (t)
k (t+ 1)
((
1 + r (t+ 1)− δ
1 + wH (t+ 1)− δ
)
(
1− u (t)
1− u (t+ 1)
s (t+ 1)
s (t)
)(1−β)) 1α
(63)
r (t) = αA (k (t))α−1 u (t)1−α (64)
wH (t) = Bβ (s (t) / (1− u (t)))
1−β (65)
k (t)
s (t)
=
(
α
1− α
)(
β
1− β
)(
u (t)
1− u (t)
)
(66)
y (t) = A (k (t))α (u (t))1−α (67)
y (t) = c (t) + iK (t) + iS (t) (68)
k (t+ 1) (1 + γ (t+ 1)) = iK (t) + (1− δ) k (t) (69)
(1 + γ (t+ 1)) = B (1− u (t))β (s (t))1−β + (1− δ) (70)
s (t+ 1) = iS (t) + (1− δ) s (t) (71)
Appendix E: Alternative model
In our model, we assume that, while increasing social interaction, investment in social
capital implies an opportunity cost in terms of foregone physical capital accumulation and
consumption. There is an alternative way to model the cost of social capital accumulation;
we may assume that individuals devote a fraction l (t) of their time to build their social
networks. Such an assumption implies the following laws of motion for human and social
capital accumulation:
H (t+ 1) = B ((1− u (t)− l (t))H (t))β (S (t))1−β + (1− δ)H (t) (72)
S (t+ 1) = Cl (t) + (1− δ)S (t) (73)
With the intertemporal utility function (9) and the physical capital accumulation law
(10), they imply the following equilibrium conditions:
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(
C (t+ 1)
C (t)
)σ
= ρ (1 + r (t+ 1)− δ) (74)
u (t)
u (t+ 1)
=
K (t)H (t+ 1)
K (t+ 1)H (t)
((
1 + r (t+ 1)− δ
1 + wH (t+ 1)− δ
)
(
(1− u (t)− l (t))
(1− u (t+ 1)− l (t+ 1))
S (t+ 1)H (t)
S (t)H (t+ 1)
)(1−β)) 1α
(75)
r (t) = αA (K (t) /u (t)H (t))α−1 (76)
wH (t) = Bβ (S (t) / (1− u (t)− l (t))H (t))
1−β (77)
1− u (t)− l (t)
1− u (t− 1)− l (t− 1)
=
S (t)H (t− 1)
S (t− 1)H (t)
(
1 + C (1−β)
(β)
(1−u(t)−l(t))H(t)
S(t)
− δ
1 + wH (t)− δ
) 1
1−β
(78)
Y (t) = A (K (t))α (u (t)H (t))1−α (79)
Y (t) = C (t) + IK (t) + IS (t) (80)
K (t+ 1) = IK (t) + (1− δ)K (t) (81)
H (t+ 1) = B ((1− u (t)− l (t))H (t))β (S (t))1−β + (1− δ)H (t) (82)
S (t+ 1) = Cl (t) + (1− δ)S (t) (83)
As before after solving the corresponding stationarized system, we are able to identify
a closed-form solution to the steady state growth rate:
γ∗H =
(
ρ
(
1− δ +
(
Bββ ((1− β)C)1−β
) 1
2−β
) 1
σ
− 1 (84)
Conversely to expression (32), this function does not depend on parameters A and α.
However, as shown in Figure 7 for baseline parameters δ=0.05, ρ=0.98, σ=2, α=0.3, A=1,
B=0.12273 and C=1.07105, it displays an inverted-U shape as in Figure 2.
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Figure 7: Human capital’s growth rate as a function of β (alternative model).
Appendix F: Data and descriptives
The dataset used in the empirical subsection consists of 74 countries:
Country list: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, East Germany, West Ger-
many, Great Britain, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Jordan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Mon-
tenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, Norway, Pak-
istan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Turkey,
Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam.
The dataset draws on publicly available data only. The following variables are available
online with the following web links:
Variables:
1. GDP per capita growth rate adjusted by for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP, expressed
in constant 2000 US Dollars) between 1980 and 2000 computed from Alan Heston,
Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for Inter-
national Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Penn-
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sylvania, September 2006 available online at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php site
/pwt62/pwt62 form.php.
2. Social capital indicators — levels of generalized trust, associational activity and norms
of civic behavior — obtained from the World Value Surveys (European and World
Values Surveys four-wave integrated data file, 1981-2004, v.20060423, 2006) available
online at http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp.
3. Human capital indicator — average years of schooling of the total population aged 15
and over from Barro and Lee (2000) available online at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/
ciddata/ciddata.html.
4. Life expectancy data obtained from World Bank online data available at
http://data.worldbank.org/topic/social-development.
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Appendix G: Effects of productivity shocks in the
goods and services sector on u (t) and γH (t)
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Figure 8: Effects of A productivity shocks on u for β = 1 and β = 0.9.
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Figure 9: Effects of A productivity shocks on u for β = 0.5 and on γH for β = 1.
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Figure 10: Effects of A productivity shocks on γH for β = 0.9 and β = 0.5.
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Appendix H: Effects of productivity shocks in the
education sector on u (t) and γH (t).
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Figure 11: Effects of B productivity shocks on u for β = 1 and β = 0.9.
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Figure 12: Effects of B productivity shocks on u for β = 0.5 and on γH for β = 1.
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Figure 13: Effects of B productivity shocks on γH for β = 0.9 and β = 0.5.
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